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Autonomy, appropriately defined as the preservation, if not the creation, of space—physical 
and intellectual—to exercise one’s own judgment, is the mantra of the modern era, and the foun-
dation of many legal rights and doctrines, particularly in the medical law context. Though it is 
persistently extended, particularly in the West, we recognize that it is not the only value that 
moves us, and this fact causes tensions and poses challenges, as amply demonstrated by the 
June 26, 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child & 
Family Services), a case in which a mature minor was forced to receive medical treatment to 
which neither she nor her parents were willing to consent. This paper considers the Court’s deci-
sion in this case with a view to exploring in detail its treatment of autonomy and that value’s de-
rivative rights, as well as its engagement with other values, critiquing the case and the trend 
that it (and other Jehovah’s Witness cases) signals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autonomy, variously described as “liberty”, “freedom”, and “the protection of personal integ-
rity”,1 is the mantra of the modern era, and the foundation of many legal instruments, doctrines, 
and rights, both international and domestic. However, though we are absolutely wedded to it—
particularly in the West where it has a strong legal voice2—and though it is persistently ex-
tended, most of us recognize that it is not, nor should it be, the only value that moves us; it can-
not be absolute. And this recognition causes tensions and poses challenges, as amply demon-
strated by the June 26, 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in A.C. v. Mani-
toba (Director of Child & Family Services) (“AC”).3 This case comment considers, first, the pri-
macy of autonomy, and then the equivocations that we have erected around its vindication, do-
ing so within the context of the AC case. In short, it considers autonomy against the backdrop of 
a recent and important medical law decision of the SCC. It then offers some preliminary obser-
vations about the position and value of the AC case in the autonomy and medical law universes, 
referencing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) in the process.4 
I 
BACKGROUND 
AC is about a minor who challenged a court order to treat her medically in the absence of her 
consent, indeed contrary to her clearly stated desire. The facts, very briefly, are as follows: 
• The appellant, A.C., a minor aged fourteen years and ten months, suffered from lower 
gastrointestinal bleeding when admitted to the hospital.5 As a Jehovah’s Witness, she re-
fused a blood transfusion and informed her physicians of the same, additionally indicat-
ing that she had an Advance Directive instructing that she not receive transfusions. Her 
parents supported her decision. 
• The following day, her treating physician requested an assessment to determine A.C.’s 
capacity to refuse treatment, which included the capacity to understand the conse-
quences of doing so, including the risk of death. The report, completed by three psychia-
trists, stated that A.C. was alert, cooperative, bright, well spoken, and occasionally teary, 
and had no psychiatric illness, concluding that A.C. understood why a transfusion may 
be recommended as well as the consequences of refusal. 
• A few days later, A.C. experienced more internal bleeding. A transfusion was recom-
mended. She refused it. She was apprehended as “a child in need of protection” under 
section 17 of the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act (“CFSA”).6 Under subsection 
25(8) of that act, a court order was sought authorizing blood transfusions as deemed 
necessary by the physician; the medical evidence demonstrated that if A.C. did not re-
ceive blood, she faced “significant risk” associated with oxygen deprivation.7 
                                                 
 
 1  Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1994) at 121-127, discusses the notion of autonomy in the medical context.  
 2  Again in the medical context, see e.g. R. Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest 
and Respect for Autonomy should be ‘First Among Equals’” (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 307. 
 3  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, 309 D.L.R. 
(4th) 581 [AC]. 
 4  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.  
 5  The Manitoba Age of Majority Act, C.C.S.M. c. A7, s. 1(1) defines a “child” as anyone under the age of 
“majority” (i.e., 18). 
 6  S.M. 1985-86, c.8, C.C.S.M. c. C80.  
 7 Supra note 3 at para. 11, Abella J. 
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• Without having undertaken an assessment of her maturity, the Provincial Court assumed 
that A.C. had capacity, but granted the treatment order, stating that a child under sixteen 
years is squarely within the court’s authority to order medical treatment in a child’s best 
interests, and that A.C.’s best interests were served by the proposed intervention. Treat-
ment was subsequently administered and A.C. recovered. 
• A.C. and her parents appealed the decision to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which dis-
missed the appeal. They then appealed to the SCC, arguing that the CFSA violated the 
Charter by infringing section 2(a) (freedom of religion), section 7 (security of the per-
son), and section 15(1) (freedom from discrimination based on age) because it denied her 
(and others under sixteen) the right to demonstrate capacity and have their treatment 
wishes respected. 
The case before the SCC turned primarily on the interpretation and application of section 25 of 
the CFSA, which authorizes child protection authorities to impose treatment on minors in the 
absence of consent.  
Ultimately, a medical examination can be authorized by the agency where the consent of a 
parent or guardian would otherwise be required. Under paragraph 25(1)(c), medical treatment 
can be authorized if: 
 (i) the treatment is recommended by a duly qualified medical practitioner or dentist, 
 (ii) the consent of a parent or guardian of the child would otherwise be required, and 
 (iii) no parent or guardian of the child is available to consent to the treatment. 
Further paragraphs of section 25 of the CFSA clarify the following: 
• Where a child is sixteen or over, neither medical examination nor treatment can be au-
thorized without the consent of the child. When a child sixteen or over refuses consent, 
or when the parents of a child under sixteen refuse consent, the authorities may apply to 
a court for an order authorizing the treatment.8 
• The court may, upon completion of a hearing, authorize any medical treatment that it 
considers to be in the best interests of the child.9 
• The court shall not make an order with respect to a child sixteen or older without the 
child’s consent unless it finds that the child is unable 
(a) to understand the information that is relevant to making a decision to 
consent or not consent to the medical treatment; or  
(b) to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making a deci-
sion to consent or not consent.10 
II 
THE PRIMACY OF AUTONOMY 
As a socio-ethical value, autonomy, grounded in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
might be defined as involving the preservation, if not the specific creation, of space—physical, 
emotional, and intellectual—to exercise one’s own judgment and to vindicate one’s own will with 
respect to matters relating to oneself.11 As shall be discussed, in Canada, the concept of auton-
                                                 
 8 Supra note 6, ss. 25(2)(3). 
 9 Ibid., s. 25(8). 
 10  Ibid., s. 25(9). 
 11  See Shawn Harmon, “Regulation of Human Genomics and Genetic Biotechnology: Risks, Values and 
Analytical Criteria” (2005) InnoGen WP-40, online: Genomics Network <http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/ 
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omy is implicated in both constitutional law and medical common law, which, together, protect 
freedoms relating to thought, decision, and action, all of which are constituent elements of au-
tonomy writ large. 
With respect to Canadian constitutional law as it is implicated by the AC case, sections 2(a) 
and 7 of the Charter state: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; 
 …  
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.  
Generally, subsection 2(a) erects a zone of protection from state interference around (1) an indi-
vidual’s personal beliefs about the foundation of “truth” relating to creation, existence, and hu-
man nature, or a philosophy of life; (2) the institutions in which individuals participate relating 
to the same; and (3) the practices individuals undertake as a result of membership in those insti-
tutions.12 The right will be infringed where (1) the claimant sincerely or profoundly holds a belief 
or practice that has a nexus with religion, and (2) the state action interferes with the claimant’s 
ability to act in accordance with that belief in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstan-
tial.13 As explicitly noted in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., the right rests on the values of auton-
omy and dignity, the objective being to shelter from state interference of a non-trivial nature 
profoundly personal beliefs that govern one’s perception of oneself, humankind, nature and, 
sometimes, a higher or different order of being, and that therefore govern one’s conduct and 
practices.14  
Section 7 protects two autonomy-implicating rights: “liberty” and “security of the person”.15 
In Big M Drug Mart16 and R. v. Oakes,17 Chief Justice Dickson articulated the concepts that in-
form the constitutional right of liberty as follows: 
• respect for individual conscience and judgment, which lies at the heart of our democratic 
political tradition; 
• respect for the ability of each individual to make free and informed decisions, which is a 
prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-
government; 
                                                                                                                                                             
media/Innogen Working Paper 40.pdf>. 
 12  See R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 [Jones]; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Edwards Books]; and Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 
2009 SCC 37, 310 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 9 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1 [Hutterian], for more on freedom of religion. Hutterian, 
citing Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, No. 45701/99, ECHR 2001-XII (ECHR), 
notes that freedom of religion has both individual and group elements. 
 13  Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 241 D.L.R. (4th) 1.  
 14  [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at paras. 94-99, 123, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [Big M Drug Mart].  
 15  See Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 204-08, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 
422 [Singh] (Wilson J. clarified that s. 7 contained three separate interests that had to be protected); Re B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 (reiterated the interests set out by Wilson J. in 
Singh); see also Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342 
[Rodriguez] (Sopinka J. stated that the right to life, grounded on the respect for life value, stood against the 
others and none could prevail a priori over another). In line with Sopinka J., I would argue that the first inter-
est, “life”, is not particularly autonomy-implicating, although the exercise of autonomy certainly depends on the 
existence of life. 
 16  Supra note 14 at paras. 94-95. 
 17  [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 119, 134. 
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• respect for human dignity, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of 
plurality and cultural/group identity, and faith in social and political institutions, all of 
which enhance participation in society. 
The SCC has held that liberty is infringed when the state interferes with the following: (1) indi-
vidual abilities to develop and realize one’s potential, plan one’s life to suit one’s character (be-
ing non-conformist, idiosyncratic, or eccentric);18 (2) individual rights to make fundamental 
choices such as where one resides;19 (3) parental rights to raise children in accordance with one’s 
conscientious beliefs;20 (4) parental decision-making with respect to children’s medical care;21 
and (5) access to medical treatment without undue delay.22 
An individual’s right to security of the person has both physical and psychological compo-
nents: the right is infringed when the state threatens to or actually violates physical integrity 
through punishment or infliction of suffering; the state also breaches the right when it causes 
psychological trauma by treating individuals as a means to an end rather than as a valued end in 
themselves, stigmatizing the individual, delivering stress and anxiety through the imposition of 
uncertainty, disruption, publicity, expense, and so on.23 In short, section 7 extends to individu-
als’ security over their physical and mental integrity and the right to maintain and control the 
same.24 As such, in R. v. Morgentaler,25 it was held that state interference with bodily integrity 
and state-imposed psychological stress brought about by use of the criminal law—both stem-
ming from an attempt by the state to control a woman’s capacity to reproduce—constitute a 
breach of the security of the person. 
The section 7 rights of liberty and security of the person therefore implicate the value of au-
tonomy in a very deep and direct way. They are directed at providing the individual with the 
physical and psychological/emotional space and safety to make judgments as to what is best for 
herself and to exercise her will in conformity therewith. In Big M Drug Mart, Chief Justice 
Dickson held that liberty constitutes allowing individuals room to exercise personal autonomy to 
live their lives and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance.26 Similarly, 
in Morgentaler, Justice Wilson stated that liberty grants the individual a degree of autonomy in 
making decisions of fundamental personal importance and pursuing one’s own conception of a 
full and rewarding life.27 
As indicated above, autonomy is also implicated in the medical common law. Support for the 
value can be found in practices and doctrines relating to consent to treatment, patients’ rights to 
information, and health data protection, all of which are critically important in the modern clin-
ical and medical research settings.28 With respect to consent, which is considered one of the 
                                                 
 18  Jones, supra note 12 at para. 76. 
 19  Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 at paras. 58-72, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 577. 
 20  Jones, supra note 12 at paras. 79-81. 
 21  B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at 362-74, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 
1. 
 22  Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at paras. 28, 43, 109-125, 254 
D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Chaoulli]. 
 23  See Singh, supra note 15; Chaoulli, ibid.; R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 655; Mills v. 
The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, 29 D.L.R. (4th) 161; R. v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 481; New 
Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124; 
and Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307,190 D.L.R. 
(4th) 513 [Blencoe]. 
 24  See R. v. Videoflicks Ltd. (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 395 (C.A.), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 10. 
 25  [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 56, 173, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Morgentaler]. 
 26  Supra note 14 at paras. 94-95.  
 27  Supra note 25; see also Blencoe, supra note 23. 
 28  See Morgentaler, supra note 25 (Dickson C.J.C. noted that, at common law, medical procedures carried 
out on a person without that person’s consent constitutes an assault, a position grounded in physical integrity); 
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most significant vehicles for realizing autonomy and the self-determination that it supports,29 
the following propositions can be distilled from the common law,30 and were endorsed by Justice 
Abella in the majority judgment of AC: 
• There is a rebuttable presumption that adults are competent, and the burden of disprov-
ing competence rests on the person challenging it.31 
• Adults are entitled to sufficient information to enable them to make a decision that is in-
formed, and to direct the course of their own medical treatment through the giving or re-
fusing of informed consent.32 
• The power to direct one’s own medical treatment includes the right to refuse life-saving 
treatment.33 
• While physicians cannot normally proceed in the absence of consent, an exception exists 
where emergency circumstances prevail and the person is not in a position to give or re-
fuse consent, the assumption being that consent is implied or that the physician is enti-
tled to proceed on the basis of necessity.34 
These rights were traditionally restricted where minors were concerned (and in certain limited 
public health situations), but those restrictions on autonomy have been eroded.35 Thus, whereas 
most minors were long considered a vulnerable class in need of (paternalistic) adult guidance 
and state protection,36 the common law has, relatively recently, recognized decisional capacity in 
minors, extending to them autonomy-based consent as well as refusal powers, even in respect of 
illnesses and conditions with dire consequences.37 Hence, it is now accepted that parental au-
thority declines in accordance with the minor’s evolution into adulthood, and, provided the mi-
nor is capable of understanding the proposed treatment and of expressing her wishes, those 
wishes must be considered (though may not be determinative). Again, the majority judgment 
supported these propositions.38 
Emphasizing the great societal importance attached to individual integrity and liberty, and 
noting that this importance is reflected in our legal system, Justice Abella stated: 
                                                                                                                                                             
see also Simon Verdun-Jones & David Weisstub, “Consent to Human Experimentation in Québec: The Applica-
tion of the Civil Law Principle of Personal Inviolability to Protect Special Populations” (1995) 18 Int’l J.L. & 
Psychiatry 163. The medical common law has evolved to include more protections, many informed by auton-
omy as an emerging value. Many of the common law protections (e.g. consent to treatment) originate in the 
concept of physical inviolability, which is aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the patient. 
 29  Verdun-Jones & Weisstub, ibid.; Bruce J. Winick, “On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives” 
(1992) 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1705. 
 30  See Rodriguez, supra note 15; Morgentaler, supra note 25; Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 114 
D.L.R. (3d) 1; Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119, 100 D.L.R. (4th) 609; Malette v. Shulman (1990), 72 
O.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [Malette]; Fleming v. Reid (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 74 (C.A.), 82 D.L.R. 
(4th) 298 [Fleming].  
 31  Supra note 3 at para. 40. 
 32  Ibid.  
 33  Ibid. at paras. 44-45. 
 34  Ibid. at para. 42. 
 35  AC, supra note 3 at para. 46, Abella J.  
 36  Exceptions here are emancipated minors and mature minors, the latter being a relatively recent concep-
tualization. 
 37  This extension began in the U.K. with Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1985] 3 
All E.R. 402 (H.L.), [1985] 3 W.L.R. 830, but quickly found a foothold in Canada in J.S.C. v. Wren (1986), 76 
AR 115 (C.A.), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 419 and Van Mol (Guardian Ad Litem of) v. Ashmore (1999), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 
637 (B.C.C.A.), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637, among other cases. 
 38  AC, supra note 3 at paras. 46-63, Abella J. 
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 The legal environment for adults making medical treatment decisions is important because it 
demonstrates the tenacious relevance in our legal system of the principle that competent individuals 
are—and should be—free to make decisions about their bodily integrity. 
She later quoted favourably from Fleming v. Reid,39 wherein it was held that every person’s body 
is inviolate, an idea deeply rooted and tied to consent. Justice Abella further exposed our appe-
tite for autonomy by suggesting that a minor’s best interests will, as she gets older and more ma-
ture, collapse into her desire and right to exercise autonomy.40 In short, there comes a time 
when it is in the child’s best interests to exercise autonomy, whatever consequences the exercise 
of that autonomy might result in; her best interests are the exercise of autonomy. 
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for herself and Justice Rothstein, was also autonomy-
supportive, but no opinion demonstrated a stronger claim that autonomy occupies the pinnacle 
of legal value than that of Justice Binnie. In his dissent, after describing forced medical treat-
ment as one of the most egregious violations of a person’s integrity, he stated: 
 [It] is ... fundamental that every competent individual is entitled to autonomy to choose or not 
to choose medical treatment except as that autonomy may be limited or prescribed within the frame-
work of the Constitution. The rights under s. 2(a) of the Charter (religious freedom) and s. 7 (liberty 
and security of the person) are given to everyone, including individuals under 16 years old.41 
He concluded that the SCC has “long preached the values of individual autonomy,” and he char-
acterized this case as a call to live up to the autonomy promise contained in sections 2(a) and 7.42 
Justice Binnie went on to hold that the state’s interest in controlling the medical treatment of 
minors ceases where a minor, though under the age of sixteen, demonstrates maturity and thus 
has no need for any overriding state control; the legitimate basis of state intervention has, by 
reason of the finding of maturity, disappeared, and the minor is entitled to live or die by her de-
cision.43 He noted that, in the present case, three psychiatrists and the judge at first instance ac-
cepted that A.C. had capacity.44 Subsection 25(8) prevented her from making the decision on her 
own and therefore contravened sections 2(a) and 7 of the Charter; it created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of incapacity that was not justified by section 1 of the Charter. 
The above demonstrates that autonomy is deeply embedded in Canadian society, is legally 
mandated and constitutionally protected, and has been extended in the health context beyond 
historical categories to persons we (still) consider incompetent to do many things. The CFSA 
empowers competent minors ages sixteen to eighteen to exercise the same autonomy rights as 
an adult; minors under sixteen, who have demonstrated their capacity, can express their wishes 
and have those wishes considered. Ultimately, while Justice Binnie’s vision did not carry the 
day, the CFSA dramatically lowers the age at which children can have a hand in decision-
making. 
III 
TENSIONS AND EQUIVOCATIONS AROUND AUTONOMY 
However, the AC case is not about the unfettered triumph of autonomy. As the case demon-
strates, we find ways to circumvent the exercise of autonomy when we consider it just or expedi-
ent. Thus even mature minors can have their wishes overridden where the court, in exercising 
its parens patriae jurisdiction or, as here, interpreting statutory provisions, is of the opinion 
that their best interests are served by another course. Writing for the majority, Justice Abella 
                                                 
 39  Supra note 30. 
 40  AC, supra note 3 at paras. 84-98. 
 41  Ibid. at para. 192. 
 42  Ibid. at para. 219.  
 43  Ibid. at paras. 221-224. 
 44  Ibid. at para. 225.  
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took some care in explaining that the requisite maturity comes gradually and unevenly, and is 
dependent on personal characteristics and context.45 She explained: 
There is considerable support for the notion that while many adolescents may have the techni-
cal ability to make complex decisions, this does not always mean that they will have the necessary ma-
turity and independence of judgment to make truly autonomous choices.46 
Moreover, maturity is terribly difficult to measure, and where we are not satisfied that it has 
been demonstrated, having reference to a number of factors, the court should determine the ap-
propriate course with input from the minor. On that issue, Justice Abella concluded: 
With our evolving understanding has come the recognition that the quality of decision-making 
about a child is enhanced by input from that child. The extent to which that input affects the best inter-
ests assessment is as variable as the child’s circumstances, but one thing that can be said with certainty 
is that the input becomes increasingly determinative as the child matures. This is true ... when deciding 
whether to accede to a child’s wishes in medical treatment situations.47 
The consequence of the CFSA, as interpreted by Justice Abella, is that if we cannot trust that a 
minor will exercise true autonomy, we will not permit her to make the decision, and, addition-
ally, we will weigh her input accordingly. In such a case, her best interests must be protected.48 
The assessment of her best interests is structured in the present case by subsection 2(1) of the 
CFSA: 
2(1) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration … and in determining best 
interests … all other relevant matters shall be considered, including the following: 
(a) the child’s opportunity to have a parent-child relationship as a wanted and needed member 
within a family structure; 
(b) the mental, emotional, physical and educational needs of the child and the appropriate 
care or treatment, or both, to meet such needs; 
(c) the child’s mental, emotional and physical stage of development; 
(d) the child’s sense of continuity and need for permanency with the least possible disruption; 
(e) the merits and the risks of any plan proposed by the agency that would be caring for the 
child compared with the merits and the risks of the child returning to or remaining within the fam-
ily; 
(f) the views and preferences of the child where they can reasonably be ascertained; 
(g) the effect upon the child of any delay in the final disposition of the proceedings; and 
(h) the child’s cultural, linguistic, racial and religious heritage. 
An integral element of this assessment is the preferences of the minor. In determining the 
weight that should be given to those preferences, the minor’s maturity must be rigorously as-
sessed.49 In the majority judgment, Justice Abella clarifies that the following factors require con-
sideration: 
• What is the nature, purpose and utility of the recommended medical treatment? What are the risks 
and benefits? 
                                                 
 45  Ibid. at paras. 71-79 (here Abella J. cited a variety of scholarly material). 
 46  Ibid. at para. 71. 
 47  Ibid. at para. 92. 
 48  Ultimately, as a minor, her objective best interests must be protected, and they are heavily coloured by 
the respect for life value. Once that minor becomes an adult, her best interests, as far as the state is concerned, 
are largely synonymous with the exercise of her own judgment, whatever consequence that might have for her 
life, health, or treatment. 
 49  See AC, supra note 3 at paras. 94-96, Abella J. 
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• Does the [minor] demonstrate the intellectual capacity and sophistication to understand the in-
formation relevant to making the decision and to appreciate the potential consequences? 
• Is there reason to believe that the [minor’s] views are stable and a true reflection of his or her core 
values and beliefs? 
• What is the potential impact of the [minor’s] lifestyle, family relationships and broader social af-
filiations on his or her ability to exercise independent judgment? 
• Are there any existing emotional or psychiatric vulnerabilities? 
• Does the [minor’s] illness or condition impact on his or her decision-making ability? 
• Is there any relevant information from adults who know the [minor], like teachers or doctors?50 
These factors reflect a structured attempt to realize another important value, not so much re-
spect for life, but solidarity with others. The above also serves to demonstrate our conviction, 
alluded to in the CFSA’s preamble, that society has a duty to protect minors and to help them 
flourish to the extent permitted by the operation of other important values and existing socio-
economic structures. The consequence for the minor is that she need only be afforded a degree 
of autonomy, imprecisely commensurate with her maturity, and society is to be afforded the 
right to paternalistically protect her life and health and vouchsafe her ability to flourish, all to a 
diminishing extent as she ages. 
Such was the conclusion of Justice Abella and Chief Justice McLachlin, both of whom found 
the CFSA constitutionally sound (or saved). Drawing on the common law, Justice Abella stated 
that the multifactored best interests approach embodied in subsection 25(8) erects a sliding 
scale of scrutiny whereby the minor’s views become increasingly determinative with greater ma-
turity; the more serious the nature of the decision and the more severe its potential health im-
pact, the greater the degree of scrutiny required.51 Minors under sixteen have the right to dem-
onstrate maturity, and courts making decisions on their behalf must give weight to their opinion 
commensurate with that maturity. In assessing maturity, the court must take into account the 
above factors. So construed, the CFSA strikes a constitutional balance between an individual’s 
fundamental right to autonomous decision-making and the law’s attempts to protect the vulner-
able from harm, and it does not violate sections 2(a), 7, or 15 of the Charter; it is neither arbi-
trary, discriminatory, nor contrary to religious freedom. 
In a minority opinion concurring in result, Chief Justice McLachlin rejected the common law 
as irrelevant,52 and stated that bodily integrity (protected by the security of the person interest 
under section 7) is not absolute and does not trump all other interests; limits placed on auton-
omy-grounded section 7 rights that advance a genuine state interest, are acceptable where they 
are shown to be based on rational grounds.53 She opined that (1) the statutory scheme success-
fully balances autonomy with society’s interest in ensuring that minors receive necessary care, 
and (2) using age sixteen to impose the burden of proving maturity is a legitimate response to 
concerns about coercion and influence (i.e., age is a reasonable proxy for independence and abil-
ity to understand and appreciate consequences of the decision and alternatives).54 As such, sec-
tion 7 was not violated. With respect to section 15, she noted that the discrimination-founding 
ground (i.e., age) must create disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotype.55 Children 
                                                 
 50  Ibid. at para. 96. 
 51 Ibid. at paras. 108-116. 
 52  Ibid. at paras. 123-126. 
 53  Ibid. at para. 137. 
 54  Ibid. at paras. 134-149 (McLachlin C.J.C. limited her analysis to s. 7 and its internal limitations, and did 
not make reference to s. 1 of the Charter). 
 55  Ibid. at para. 150. 
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are recognized as a highly vulnerable group.56 Hence, the use of age in the present setting (i.e., 
the requirement that the judge take into account the treatment preferences of those under six-
teen where maturity is demonstrated) is ameliorative, and thus not contrary to section 15.57 Fi-
nally, while the scheme does violate subsection 2(a), it is justifiable under section 1 of the Char-
ter because the objective of ensuring the health, safety, and life of vulnerable minors is pressing 
and substantial, and the means chosen—giving discretion to the court to order treatment after a 
consideration of all relevant circumstances—is a proportionate limit.58 
Such was the decision. A.C. received her treatment, her post hoc appeal was dismissed, the 
statutory scheme was found to be constitutional and the authorities were concomitantly exoner-
ated of any wrongdoing, and A.C. lived to fight another day. The question remains: What is the 
value of this case, generally, with respect to its implications for autonomy as a value, and with 
respect to the rights of liberty, security of the person, and freedom of religion, all of which are at 
least partially grounded on autonomy (and their support of prior consent to medical treatment 
and the duty to obtain it)? 
IV 
VALUING THE CASE: AUTONOMY, MATURITY & HONESTY 
A. The Case Generally 
From a general standpoint, this case is important insofar as the majority judgment summa-
rizes and clarifies the common law of consent to medical treatment for adults and mature mi-
nors. Additionally, and equally pragmatically, it reasonably and clearly outlines the proper proc-
ess, under this particular statutory scheme, for assessing maturity and approaching decisions 
with respect to minors of different ages. Having said that, an obvious criticism of the case stems 
from the bewildering conclusion of Chief Justice McLachlin that no reviewable error had been 
committed by the application judge.59 While the passing of the medical emergency (and indeed 
of A.C.’s status as an under-sixteen minor) makes this point less significant, the fact remains 
that Justice Kaufman, the applications judge, utterly failed to anticipate (and thus comply with) 
the demands of the CFSA as enunciated by the majority. He never subjected the psychiatric re-
port to a searching judicial review, refused to allow A.C. to present evidence at the conference 
call hearing of her capacity, and erroneously concluded that such evidence from her would be 
irrelevant because she was under sixteen.60 
B. The Case and the Autonomy Value 
With respect to the autonomy value more specifically, the case is ambivalent. Although 
autonomy continues to dominate in Western medical practices, and its importance to that set-
ting (and others) is explicitly accepted, the case explicitly recognizes the tensions between our 
demands for autonomy, on the one hand, and our lingering (if often un-vindicated) sense of re-
sponsibility toward others, including minors, on the other hand.61 This is both important and 
valuable. Unfortunately, the decision did not actively or intellectually engage with these tensions 
                                                 
 56  See Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 257. 
 57  See AC, supra note 3 at para. 152, McLachlin C.J.C. 
 58  Ibid. at paras. 153-156, McLachlin C.J.C. 
 59  Ibid. at para. 159; see also paras. 118-121 (Abella J. found the issue of the validity of the treatment order 
to be moot). 
 60  Ibid. at paras. 10-12, 118-120, 159, 173. 
 61  The two concurring judgments pointed out that minors under 16 are often not fully formed beings to 
whom we should abdicate all decision-making powers. 
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in an entirely satisfactory manner, and is therefore perhaps more significant for what it fails to 
do. Most significantly, again from a value perspective, it fails to: 
• offer authoritative definitions of autonomy, solidarity and respect for life as moving so-
cial and ethical values; 
• explore the interaction of these values with the implicated constitutional rights and 
therefore the practical demands of these values; or 
• undertake a deep interrogation of the appropriate balance between these values in the 
context of a “best interests of the child” assessment. 
While some of these undertakings were not strictly necessary for the disposition of the case, 
their explicit consideration would certainly have contributed to a richer decision. Moreover, as 
an undeniably important institution for social and policy development within our constitutional 
setting, the SCC might be expected to engage with these higher level values, particularly in the 
medical law setting which is so imbued with concepts of social, ethical, and constitutional sig-
nificance. 
C. The Case and Autonomy-Derivative Rights 
The value of the case can be similarly questioned in regards to its engagement with rights 
derivative of autonomy, particularly the fundamental right of freedom of religion and the more 
mechanistic right of consent in the medical context.  
With respect to the exercise of consent in the medical context, there are two points worth 
mentioning briefly. First, there is the majority and concurring judgments’ differential treatment 
of minors over sixteen and minors under sixteen. One might argue that this differential treat-
ment is curious in the absence of any evidence of a compelling state interest in subjecting the 
medical treatment of those under sixteen to judicial control irrespective of their capacity to 
make such decisions themselves. Searching criticism has already been levelled against them for 
this unsupported differentiation which need not be repeated here.62 
Second, there is the blunt manner in which the state interjected itself between the minor pa-
tient and the exercise of her autonomy through the evidence-light procedure of having her de-
clared “a child in need of protection” under the CFSA. Despite A.C.’s apparent competence, and 
her parents’ support of her refusal to consent, the state is statutorily empowered to (and did) 
intervene, setting in motion a process that removed A.C.’s decisional capacity and vested it in 
the courts. While rhetorical affinity for autonomy may endure, and may even, to some extent, be 
reiterated in the statutory scheme, the process itself amply demonstrates the tensions noted 
above.  
With respect to the former and more fundamental right of religious freedom, the case of-
fered little guidance—and less hope—around the vindication of this subsection 2(a) Charter 
right in this particular setting. It is well known that the rejection of blood transfusions by Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses is fundamental to their religious convictions. They believe that blood represents 
life, and they interpret the Bible to mean that respect for the gift of life requires them to abstain 
from accepting blood—through food, drink, or transfusion—to sustain life, even in times of 
emergency.63 Devout Jehovah’s Witnesses understand a spiritual life to require that death be 
                                                 
 62  See AC, supra note 3 at paras. 206-237, Binnie J., dissenting. 
 63  The Watchtower Society maintains that transfusions are synonymous with eating blood, which is forbid-
den in Genesis 9:3-5 and Acts 15:20-29 of the Old Testament. For a discussion on Jehovah’s Witness policy, see 
Lee Elder, “Why Some Jehovah’s Witnesses Accept Blood and Conscientiously Reject Official Watchtower Soci-
ety Blood Policy” (2000) 26 Journal of Medical Ethics 375-380, and also The Watchman Expositor, “The 
Watchtower Society’s New Policy on Blood Transfusions” (2000), online: The Watchman Expositor 
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faced without certain modern medical treatments, namely those requiring the reception of 
blood. Further, they see this rejection of blood as risking harm only to the individual, and to no-
body else (although this might be contested from a relational point of view).64 
Given the above, and as noted by Justice Binnie,65 the interference with A.C.’s religious con-
science far exceeded the “non-trivial”. However, the freedom of religion claim received scant at-
tention in the two concurring judgments,66 the majority contending that allowing evidence of 
maturity was sufficient to dispose of it. Given the patently poor record of judicial vindication of 
religious beliefs in the medical context, particularly those of Jehovah’s Witnesses,67 one would 
have hoped for a much more thoughtful consideration of the interaction between faith, religious 
community practices, best interests, minors, and medical treatment. One is left wondering: 
What is really happening with freedom of religion insofar as its enjoyment by minors is con-
cerned? 
We might speculate that the judiciary, which appears to adopt a largely secular, humanist 
stance, is somewhat suspicious that the (often archaic and dogmatic) religious beliefs which re-
strain mature minors like A.C. from accepting treatment are often inappropriately considered or 
only partially understood, or indeed are not personally held with sufficient conviction; these is-
sues are difficult to test in individuals who are not yet fully socially or morally formed, and the 
best interests approach would seem to necessitate such an assessment, which is jettisoned once 
the individual reaches maturity.68 
We might speculate that the judiciary is reluctant to allow minors to make irreversible deci-
sions based on beliefs that some would characterize as superstition and that others would char-
acterize as scriptural misinterpretations; decisions that, upon a reading of the cases, most courts 
would consider unwise. 
Alternatively, judicial resistance to accepting refusals from minors in a highly religious envi-
ronment may stem from the perception that observance (or subservience) to a scripted religion 
may circumscribe the minor’s horizons, which is to say her ability to seek and consider broader 
opinions and to think critically, or perhaps rationally.69 It is certainly recognized that social con-
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://www.watchman.org/jw/jwtransfusions2000.htm>. 
 64  For more on Jehovah’s Witness policy, see “Are you Resisting the Spirit of the World?” The Watchtower 
(1 April 1994) 16; see also “Questions from Readers” The Watchtower (15 June 2000) 29. 
 65  AC, supra note 3 at para. 215. 
 66  See ibid. at paras. 112-13, Abella J; see also paras. 153-56, McLachlin C.J.C.  
 67  See ibid. at paras. 57, 59, 62, Abella J. The characterization of the record as ‘poor’ is based purely on the 
fact that most s. 2(a) challenges regarding treatment of minors have not succeeded with the result that, while 
that life may have been saved (a positive result from many perspectives), that individual’s (and his or her par-
ents’) s. 2(a) rights have been overridden in a very fundamental way. Ultimately, no court in either the U.K. or 
Canada has upheld the refusal of a minor (under 16) of medical treatment that was likely to preserve his or her 
prospects for a normal and healthy future; concomitantly, courts have upheld a minor’s wishes where those 
wishes are adjudged to be consistent with the minor’s best interests, largely determined to be continued life. 
 68  See Malette, supra note 30 (the Ontario Court of Appeal awarded damages for battery to a Jehovah’s 
Witness who received blood against her express wishes). We might take notice that, regardless of the suspicion 
with which courts might view religious dogma, they do permit competent adults to refuse treatment. 
 69  See T.H. McLaughlin, “Parental Rights and Religious Upbringing of Children” (1984) 18 Journal of Phi-
losophy of Education 75, and Margaret Brazier & Caroline Bridge, “Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent 
Autonomy” in Michael Freeman, ed., Children, Medicine and the Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 461; Re 
T.D.D. (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 761 (Sask. Q.B.), [1999] 6 W.W.R. 327 (Experts concluded that TD was less ma-
ture than the average 13 year-old because his social experiences were limited to his family and church, and he 
was deeply under the influence of his father, who was providing him with inaccurate information about risks 
and options. The Court concluded that this situation left TD with a lack of understanding or appreciation of the 
medical treatment he required. Thus, he was considered a minor unable to consent or refuse consent to treat-
ment. The case does nothing to assuage the perception that religion circumscribes critical-thinking on the part 
of minors.); see also Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. H. (B.) (2002), 329 A.R. 395 (Q.B.), [2002] 7 
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text has a strong influence on minors and their competency, and social pressures can come from 
family or peer groups or religious institutions, often invisible or opaque.70 
The point is that, while the measurable result is that we give rhetorical pre-eminence to 
autonomy (and some weight to religious freedom), we contract that autonomy when the resul-
tant decision is seemingly irrational and based on religious tenets. Greater clarity around the 
interaction of these values and rights, and their exercise by minors (and adults) would have been 
welcome and useful. 
Justice Abella noted that certain scholars advance the position that minors should be per-
mitted to exercise their autonomy only insofar as it does not threaten their life or health.71 While 
seriously denting our notional compliance with autonomy, this would be more intellectually 
honest insofar as present practices seem to approach the issue of medical treatment of minors 
on that footing. Similarly, present practices seem to equate best interests with continued life, 
often with little overt consideration of other relevant factors72 including ongoing familial rela-
tionships and conceptions of “the good death”, which is a significant feature of some cultures.73 
Finally, one might question the wisdom of “saving” the (religious) child if she is subse-
quently shunned by family and excluded from other valued social and spiritual contexts, or, 
more tragically, forced to endure a life in fear that she has lost her immortal soul and place in 
heaven. We have no evidence concerning A.C.’s post-recovery situation. Despite the transfusion 
is she accepted by her family and/or her church? Does her faith continue to buoy her? Does she 
still believe that God is with her or will save her come the end? This is an area where empirical 
evidence might improve future adjudication. Having said that, the heterogeneity of Jehovah’s 
Witness communities has been noted, and “pardons” have been extended to both adults and mi-
nors who have received blood products.74 
CONCLUSION: TREATING KIDS LIKE KIDS 
Whatever its shortcomings, the consequence of this case is to constitutionally ground an ex-
tension to mature minors of the right to participate in decisions with respect to their medical 
care; its broad stroke is to further entrench the concept of autonomy. However, it permits child 
welfare authorities to intervene on behalf of a minor (and in contradiction of her wishes) when it 
considers the minor’s best interests to be better served by an alternate course (i.e., as deter-
mined by the court on evidence furnished by the authorities and operating within the statutory 
                                                                                                                                                             
W.W.R. 616.  
 70  See Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006) 14 European Journal of Philosophy 1.  
 71  AC, supra note 3 at para. 79 (Abella J. cites John Eekelaar, “The Emergence of Children’s Rights” (1986) 
6 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 161); see also H. (T.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1996] W.D.F.L. 
2497, 138 D.L.R. (4th) 144 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (violating a minor’s freedom of religion is justified where the intent 
is to save or preserve her life); Cf. Procureur General du Canada c. Hôpital Notre-Dame et un autre, [1984] 
C.S. 426 (Qué. C.S.), 8 C.R.R. 382 (a case concerning a non-minor that held that as a matter of public policy 
sanctity of life, equated by some with inviolability, could override autonomy). 
 72  See Re Y. (A.) (1993), 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91 (Nfld. S.C.), 348 A.P.R. 91 (a Jehovah’s Witness boy was un-
dergoing chemotherapy which was anticipated to have only a 10-40% chance of inhibiting the progress of the 
cancer), which demonstrates that usually, other factors are only considered in cases where the chances of sur-
vival are slim. 
 73  See Karen E. Steinhauser et al., “In Search of a Good Death: Observations of Patients, Families and Pro-
viders” (2000) 132 Annals of Internal Medicine 825; Tony Walter, “Historical and Cultural Variants on the 
Good Death” (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 218; Kathryn Proulx & Cynthia Jacelon, “Dying with Dignity: 
The Good Patient Versus the Good Death” (2004) 21 American Journal of Hospice & Palliative Medicine 116; 
Susan Orpett Long, “Cultural Scripts for a Good Death in Japan and the United States: Similarities and Differ-
ences” (2004) 58 Social Science & Medicine 913. 
 74  See Kenneth S. Hickey & Laurie Lyckholm, “Child Welfare Versus Parental Autonomy: Medical Ethics, 
the Law, and Faith-Based Healing” (2004) 25 Theoretical Medicine 265 at 271. 
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structure as interpreted by the SCC). Like the Court itself, and as perhaps is apparent, I have a 
certain level of inner conflict—of ambiguity—toward this final disposition. 
On the one hand, the protection of autonomy rights is one of the most important means of 
respecting individuals, and we should not be reticent to vindicate those rights, even when we 
disagree with them (so long as their exercise does not harm another). Further, the law should 
reflect social reality, which is complex, even when this injects some uncertainty into the law; the 
complex reality is that young people are required to navigate through an increasingly compli-
cated and demanding world, and they are expected to process and cope with ever-increasing 
amounts of information, and, as such, they are increasingly sophisticated and independent-
minded.75 Therefore, we should be reluctant to force them to bow to the will of adults (or courts) 
who may, given their own circumstances, know little better than the minor, or who have their 
own interests rather than the minor’s at heart, or who may be vindicating their own values, to 
which the minor may not subscribe. From this perspective, autonomy generally, and the auton-
omy rights of minors more specifically (including A.C.’s), have been dealt a regrettable body 
blow. 
On the other hand, in a hard world where life is diminishing in value, it is heartening to be-
lieve that we still harbour a respect for life, that we wish to preserve health and possibilities for 
individual human flourishing, and that we strive to protect vulnerable groups (like children). 
While young people are developing earlier and face greater challenges than before, and while we 
should respect them and treat them well and kindly (and even as equals where circumstances 
merit it), we should never forget that they are still children, and not fully formed (i.e. most peo-
ple, upon coming into the fullness of their faculties and having experienced a bit more of life do 
not hold the same opinions about life and the world that they did when they were fifteen years 
old). While we should vindicate rights, including rights to exercise religion and to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment, thereby protecting autonomy (and liberty and security of the per-
son), we might properly stop short when the natural result is the death of a young person who 
could be healed, and who (we believe) has everything ahead of them. In such cases, there is no 
disgrace in treating them as children; we should exercise judgment intended to help them and 
keep them alive. 
Ultimately, the CFSA, as interpreted by the SCC, recognizes the capacity of a minor and 
permits her to exercise it. Perhaps it represents our best efforts to reconcile autonomy in young-
er people with our benevolent and paternalistic desire to protect them, and in doing so shows 
them “sufficient” respect. Perhaps, in the end, we should just “let kids be kids” and not worry 
that their autonomy rights have been dealt a blow. 
                                                 
 75  For more on the development of youth and their status in the complex modern world, see Reuven Ka-
hane, The Origins of Postmodern Youth: Informal Youth Movements in a Comparative Perspective (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1997); see also Frank Biocca, “New Media Technology and Youth: Trends in the Evolution of New Me-
dia” (2000) 27 Journal of Adolescent Health 22.  
